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pre-commitment game in which both governments choose when to set their export subsidies.
These results are robust to having stochastic length of commitment period and to allowing pre-
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1 Introduction
An important contribution in international trade theory is the inclusion of imperfect competition in
international trade. A natural result of this integration has been the study of trade policies, carried
out by national governments in the presence of international imperfect competition. One particular
type of model of international trade with imperfect competition is the “third country model,” where
home ﬁrms sell all their production to a third market. This particular simpliﬁcation has stressed
the potential role of governments to shift proﬁts from foreign to domestic ﬁrms, highlighting how
apparently modest interventions by governments can have large eﬀects on proﬁts, national welfare
and export market shares.
The use of strategic trade policy by governments usually take place between a small number
of players with oligopolistic industries, and extend over long periods of time through a protracted
retaliation process.1 Policy measures are usually well prepared and planned for a long time and
generally last for several years or even government administrations, and the issue of the synchro-
nization or not of these policy measures might become relevant. For example, governments can
always retaliate a trade policy set up by a rival government. This retaliation will take time to be
put into practice, and once set, will be in place for some time, even after the foreign government
has had time to change his policy again. This means that both governments need to be aware that
when they set their policy, they will inﬂuence foreign governments and at the same time, they will
be inactive during some time after a possible retaliation. In static models, retaliation by the foreign
government does not take into account that in turn the home government may counter-retaliate in
( an o ts od i s t a n t )f u t u r e .
In spite of these features, most of the literature on strategic trade policy has focused on static, one-
period games, extended only to allow for multiple stages in which ﬁrms and governments interact.
Even multi-stage models are, however, one-shot games in that ﬁrms and governments only make
decisions about a particular variable (subsidies, output, R&D, etc.) only once.2 These models
cannot capture the continuous nature of rivalries between ﬁrms and between governments. Some
models which have tried to extend the strategic trade literature to truly dynamic settings have
adopted the repeated game framework for their analysis.3 These models usually have the problem
of multiplicity of equilibria which reduces their predictive power.
In this paper we develop an inﬁnite horizon third-country model with two governments and
two ﬁrms. Governments live forever, and ﬁrms live for one period, being replaced every period.4
Therefore, all the action takes place at the government level. We restrict governments to use Markov
Strategies, avoiding multiple equilibria as in models using repeated versions of the static games.
1See, for example the survey by Krishna and Thursby (1990).
2See, for example the models of Spencer and Brander (1983), Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman
(1986), Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Neary (1994), Maggi (1996) and Neary and Leahy (2000). In all these models, key
to the strategic trade literature, ﬁrms and governments only have to choose a particular variable once in the game.
3Some examples are Davidson (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) who consider how trade policy (set once
at the beginning of the game) may aﬀect the ability of ﬁrms to collude using trigger strategies in a repeated game.
Collie (1993) considers the opposite case in which long lived governments play an inﬁnitely repeated version of the
Brander and Spencer (1985) export-subsidy game where ﬁrms compete ` al aC o u r n o t .
4Allowing for inﬁnitely lived ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increases the complexity of the model, increasing the state space
to four dimensions. An alternative assumption could be that ﬁrms are “myopic” and therefore take decisions only for
the current period.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 2
The benchmark case is the case of Cournot competition every period at the ﬁrm level, preceded by
government policy-setting. To introduce the possibility of retaliation, we assume, in the benchmark
case, that governments commit to their trade policies for two periods. This ensures that by the time
the foreign government reacts, the home government has not changed his policy already.5
We examine the cases in which both governments set their policy in the same periods (syn-
chronization) and on alternating periods (staggering). Note that when governments alternate their
policy setting (staggered game) they in practice alternate as Stackelberg leaders: when the foreign
government decides on their next subsidy the domestic government is committed to its present sub-
sidy, and therefore inﬂuences the choice of the foreign government. Governments switch their role
of Stackelberg leader and follower in the following period.
We ﬁnd that, when ﬁrms compete a la Cournot in the third market, governments have an incentive
to set higher subsidies in the staggered game than in the synchronized game (which coincides with
subsidies in the static game). The reason is simple: each government knows that it will play as a
Stackelberg leader during one period. As output subsidies are strategic substitutes in this setting,
they have an incentive to impose a subsidy beyond the static Nash equilibrium level, in order to
induce the rival government to lower theirs and increase domestic welfare. As roles are reversed in
each period, both governments are locked into this mutually damaging policy outcome. Therefore,
we ﬁnd that the introduction of dynamic considerations reinforces the case for strategic trade policy.
We extend this benchmark case in a number of directions. First, we try to endogenize the choice
of synchronization versus staggering in a game of timing. We ﬁnd that synchronization arises as
the Nash equilibrium of the timing game played before the policy game starts. Second, we extend
the model to diﬀerent modes of competition and investment capabilities by ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that
government policy (either output subsidies or R&D subsidies) are higher or lower than the static
equivalent depending on whether subsidies are strategic substitutes or complements. When subsidies
are strategic complements, the staggered game yields lower subsidies than the static equivalent,
therefore getting both governments closer to their joint welfare—maximum.
The third extension allows the length of commitment to be stochastic, instead of two periods.
This reﬂects instances where governments are uncertain about their political process in their rival
country’s. We also ﬁnd that subsidies in the Cournot case are higher than the static output subsi-
dies. More interestingly, subsidies are decreasing in the expected length of the commitment period,
showing that the expected time a government will be tied to policy determines how far a it wants
to set its “dynamic” subsidy away from the static one.
The fourth extension allows for governments to remain inactive, as an alternative to setting
a subsidy when their time to act arrives. As in the case of endogenous timing, we show that
synchronization (but not staggering) is robust in the sense of Maskin and Tirole (1988b).
Finally, we extend the model making the choice of governments slightly more ﬂexible. In par-
ticular, governments commit to their policy for the next two periods, although we allow them to
set their subsidies at diﬀerent levels for the two periods. We call this predetermined (but ﬂexible)
trade policy. We show that governments actually prefer to set their subsidies diﬀerently in their two
5Governments may want to commit their policies for more than one period because they face implementation costs
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periods when they stagger their timing. This is easy to see since governments will like to set diﬀerent
subsidies when they are acting as Stackelberg leaders or Stackelberg followers. Therefore we have
endogenous policy cycles in the staggered game. As before, when we endogenize the timing of policy
setting, governments prefer to synchronize their timing, as they get closer to the cooperative (joint
welfare maximizing) solution.
There are few dynamic models of strategic trade beyond the repeated game framework. Dockner
and Haug (1990) study trade policy where ﬁrms interact in a diﬀerential game, with governments
setting their policy at the beginning of the game. Cheng (1987) studies a dynamic version of Spencer
and Brander (1983) and ﬁnds that R&D subsidies are also optimal in the dynamic setting.
Perhaps the closest to our work is Tanaka (1988). He studies an inﬁnite horizon game where ﬁrms
stagger their choice of quantity produced and they have to commit to that choice for two periods.
Governments only act once and they commit simultaneously to their whole path of export subsidies at
the beginning of the game (open—loop equilibrium). He only analyzes Cournot competition between
ﬁrms, the case of staggered quantity setting, and a model where ﬁrms only decide on short-term
variables (output) without previous investment in long-term variables (e.g. capacity or R&D). He
ﬁnds that ﬁrms are more sensitive to export subsidies in this dynamic setting, which lead to smaller
equilibrium subsidies set by governments at the beginning of the game. As in Maskin and Tirole
(1987), he ﬁnds that ﬁrms behave more competitively and therefore output and welfare are both
higher than under the static version of the game.6 In our paper, when governments stagger their
subsidy setting, subsidies and output are higher than in the static Cournot game, but this means a
lower welfare for both exporting countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark case
with synchronized and staggered subsidy-setting, and develops the ﬁrst approximation to a game of
timing. Section 3 presents in detail the extensions outlined before. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
We use the standard third-country model allowing for investment in R&D by ﬁrms before competing
in the third market but after governments set their policy (as in Spencer and Brander (1983)). Each
of two exporting countries has a ﬁrm competing for exports to a third country. We assume that
the third country’s consumers, where exports are sold by both countries, have a linear demand, and
ﬁrms have a constant marginal cost of production:
pi(xi,x j)=a − b(xi + γxj)( 1 )
C(xi,∆i)=( c − θ∆i)xi (2)
Firm i’s proﬁts are, therefore:
Πx





6The equilibrium subsidy in Tanaka (1988) is lower than under the static version of the model, and therefore this
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where γ measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation, ∆i is investment in R&D and η = θ2
φb
measures the eﬀectiveness of R&D as in Leahy and Neary (1996).
Each period, governments and ﬁrms play a three stage game in which governments simultaneously
choose their subsidies, ﬁrms then choose the level of R&D (∆i) and then compete in the market by
choosing simultaneously their strategic variable (prices or quantities). This gives rise to four possible
scenarios depending on whether ﬁrms compete in quantities (Cournot) or in prices (Bertrand) and
on whether governments subsidize exports (zi = 0) or subsidize R&D (si = 0). We also examine
other two possible scenarios in which ﬁrms do not invest in R&D before competing in the market
(in prices or quantities), which is equivalent to set ∆i = 0for both ﬁrms.
Firms only live for one period and a new ﬁrm is reborn each period, while governments are
inﬁnitely lived.7 Notice that, since governments act ﬁrst in every period and ﬁrms live for only
one period, quantities, prices and R&D will be chosen by ﬁrms as a function of subsidies set by
governments in the ﬁrst stage of that period. Therefore, from the perspective of governments,
the proﬁt function in (3) becomes a function of the subsidies chosen by both governments.8.I f
governments set subsidies to output, then zi = 0in (3) and we can write government i’s utility
function as the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁts minus the cost of the subsidy:
fi(si,s −i)=ˆ Πx
i (si,s −i) − si · xi(si,s −i)
where ˆ Πx




i(si,s −i)) is the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt after replac-
ing the equilibrium values of quantities and R&D investment. Similarly, if governments set subsidies
to R&D, then si = 0and
fi(zi,z −i)=ˆ Πx
i (zi,z −i) − zi · ∆i(zi,z −i)
As in Maskin and Tirole (1988 a,b) we assume that long lived agents (in this case, both governments)
have to set their strategic variable (output or R&D subsidies) for the subsequent two periods.9 Since
ﬁrms live only for one period, the relevant payoﬀ function will be fi(.,.) described before. Speciﬁcally,
let each government i choose a subsidy si
t for the next two periods. Time is discrete, indexed by
t, and the horizon is inﬁnite. As argued before, at time t, government i’s instantaneous payoﬀ






where f(.) is quadratic.10 The following table summarizes the properties of the f(.,.) function for
7Alternatively, one may think that both governments and ﬁrms are inﬁnitely lived, but ﬁrms behave myopically,
while governments a far-sighted.
8Notice that, even though the subsidies chosen by the foreign government do not aﬀect domestic proﬁts directly,
they aﬀect them indirectly through their eﬀect on the R&D, quantities or prices chosen by the foreign ﬁrm, which do
aﬀect domestic proﬁts.
9One can think of big costs of adjusting policy in the short run, which makes the government unable to change
his policy once it has been set. Jun and Vives (2001) analyze the case of (ﬁnite) adjustment costs between periods
in a structure similar to Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988b). Their qualitative results for the Markov perfect equilibria
of that game are the same as the case in which actions have to be the same in both periods (i.e. inﬁnite adjustment
costs). Of course, the assumption of a ﬁxed policy for two periods is a simpliﬁcation, as adjustment costs would imply
state-dependent policies instead of the time-dependent policies used in this paper.
10This reduced form f(.) is obtained, for example, in a diﬀerentiated goods model with linear demands and constant
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Sign[f2(¯ s, ¯ s)] — — —* — —* —*
Sign[f11] — — —* — —* —*
Sign[f12] — —* — + —/+* —
Sign[f22] + +* +* + +* +*
|f11| > |f12| yes yes* yes* yes yes* yes*
Sign of optimal
subsidy in
static game (ˆ s)
+12 +13 +14 —15 +/—16 +17
* for permissible (i.e.low) values of η and γ
As can be observed from the table, some market structures and policy instruments require a
suﬃciently big degree of product diﬀerentiation (i.e. low γ) or R&D that is not too cost-eﬀective
(i.e. low η). This is necessary to ensure that we have an interior solution (i.e. both ﬁrm exporting
to the third country) and that second-order conditions are satisﬁed.
In all the applications we examine, an increase in the subsidy set by the foreign government




t ) < 0
Both governments have the same discount factor δ between 0and 1. Government i’s intertemporal











Since governments commit to subsidies for two periods, we can have two types of patterns of subsidy-
setting by the two governments. We will say that governments synchronize their choice of subsidies
if they choose policy in the same periods (odd or even). Alternatively, we will say that governments
stagger their choice of subsidies if they set them in diﬀerent periods, acting sequentially over an
inﬁnite horizon.
11The mathematica program used to simulate all these scenarios can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12Brander and Spencer (1985)
13Spencer and Brander (1983), Neary and Leahy (2000), Kujal and Ruiz (2002).
14Spencer and Brander (1983), Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996).
15Eaton and Grossman (1986)
16Neary and Leahy (2000) develop a numerical simulation where the optimal output subsidy is negative when ﬁrms
invest in R&D and compete ` a la Bertand. However, Kujal and Ruiz (2002) show analytically that the sign of the
optimal output subsidy depends on the eﬀectiveness of R&D, measured by η. The optimal subsidy is indeed negative
if R&D is not too eﬀective (i.e., low η), but positive for high (though “permissible”) values of η.
17Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996).Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 6
We restrict ourselves to Markov Strategies, and will look for Markov Perfect Equilibria as devel-
oped in Maskin and Tirole (1988 a,b).18 As a result, governments only react to the current policy
of the other government. The use of Markov Strategies means that government i’s strategy speciﬁes
as u b s i d ya tt i m et that can only depend on the subsidy of the other government entering into its
instantaneous beneﬁt function for that period fi
t. That is, government i’s strategy only depends on
the “payoﬀ relevant” history.
We restrict attention to Markov strategies for two reasons. First, limiting the strategy space of
players reduces the set of equilibria of dynamic games. No role is given to past history that does not
aﬀect current payoﬀs. This may seem like a sensible assumption in many instances. For example,
it rules out trigger strategies, and therefore the multiplicity of equilibria in repeated games implied
by the folk theorem. Second, the appeal of Markov strategies lies in its simplicity. They have been
justiﬁed mainly on the basis of limited rationality and complexity costs: Markov strategies are the
simplest strategies that can be treated as rational. Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) show that, if
we require strategies to have ﬁnite (although arbitrarily long) memory and players bear a complexity
cost related to memory length, then every Nash equilibrium of a staggered games (similar to ours)
must be in Markov strategies.19 Maskin and Tirole (2001) show that the concept of Markov perfect
equilibrium is robust to a small perturbation in payoﬀs, and show how learning and complexity costs
give rise to Markov strategies.
2.1 Synchronized Subsidy-setting
If governments set their subsidies in a synchronized way, the optimal Markov Strategy of government
i is deﬁned by:
Max
si f(si,s −i)+δf(si,s −i)( 5 )
Notice that since both governments set their subsidies in the same periods and those subsidies are
ﬁxed for two periods, the program repeats itself every two periods. This is why we only need to
analyze the optimal subsidy set for two periods (as in (5)).
The ﬁrst and second order conditions for this problem are
f1(si,s −i)=0( 6 )
f11(si,s −i) < 0(7)
which we assume are satisﬁed.
From (6) and using the implicit function theorem we derive the reaction function of government
i, which we denote as si = s(s−i). We restrict attention to globally stable Markov Perfect Equilibria
18Maskin and Tirole develop the ﬁrst applications of Markov perfect equilibrium to industrial organization, studying
Cournot competition (1987), the emergence of Edgeworth price cycles and the kinked demand curve under Bertrand
competition (1988b), and quantity competition with large ﬁxed costs (1988a).
19Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) also show a stronger result: if memory length is uniformly bounded, every
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such that |s (.)| < 1. Using the implicit function theorem we have that s (s−i)=−
f12
f11. Therefore,
to satisfy the stability condition we need the following restriction on government’s beneﬁts:
|f11| > |f12| (8)
Which implies that the own eﬀect of a subsidy over the government’s beneﬁts be greater that the
eﬀect of the other government’s subsidy.
If equations (6), (7) and (8) are fulﬁlled,20 then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
subsidy ˆ s for the synchronized game satisfying:
ˆ s = si = s(s−i),i =1 ,2.
f1(ˆ s, ˆ s)=0( 9 )
Let ˆ si be the solution to (5). Notice that ˆ si is the Nash Equilibrium of the one-period static
game where governments choose their subsidies simultaneously.
2.2 Staggered Subsidy-setting
Without loss of generality, assume that government 1 sets its subsidy in odd periods and government
2 sets it in even periods. Following Maskin and Tirole (1988 a,b), we deﬁne one reaction function
for each player. We restrict ourselves to Markov strategies, which we call R1(s2)a n dR2(s1). Note
that these dynamic reaction functions depend only on the current subsidy of the other government,
which is the one aﬀecting its current period payoﬀ.
As in Maskin and Tirole (1988a) we solve the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the staggered
game by using dynamic programming. Given an equilibrium pair of Markov Strategies R1(s2)
and R2(s1), let V 1(s2) be the present discounted value of government 1’s beneﬁts given that last
period government 2 set s2 and henceforth both governments play optimally, according to their
Markov strategies R1(s2)a n dR2(s1).21 Also, given the pair R1(s2)a n dR2(s1), let W1(s1)b et h e
present discounted value of government 1’s beneﬁts given that last period ﬁrm 1 played s1 and that
henceforth both ﬁrms play optimally, according to their strategies R1(s2)a n dR2(s1).22 We deﬁne
V 2(s1)a n dW2(s2) symmetrically.
For the reaction and value functions

R1(s2),R 2(s1),V1,V2,W1,W2
to correspond to an equi-














20These equations are fulﬁlles for all the cases considered in the paper: Cournot or Bertrand competition, with and
without R&D investment by ﬁrms in each period and when governments use output or R&D subsidies (the latter if
ﬁrms invest in R&D).
21Recall that governments set their subsidies for two periods. Therefore, if government 2 set s2 in the previous
period, then government 1 faces the same subsidy s2 in this period, when it has to make his choice of s1.
22In this case, if government 1 set s1 in the previous period, it means that this period it has no choice but to stick





+ δV 1(R2(s1)) (12)
with symmetric equations for V 2 and W2.
Since the beneﬁt function f(.) is quadratic, we will restrict attention to linear dynamic reaction
functions of the type Ri(s−i)=αi + β
is−i. As in the synchronized game, we will also restrict
attention to stable Markov Perfect Equilibria, such that
 β
i  < 1.
























Following the results in Lau (1997) we know that in any symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
to the game deﬁned in equations (10) to (12), the (common) slope of the dynamic reaction function




3δ(1 + δ)f22 + β
22δf12 + βf11(1 + δ)=−f12 (15)
Notice that in order to have a stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium, we also need the solution to
equation (15) to be less than one in absolute value. In the remainder of the paper we will assume
that this condition is satisﬁed, and that this polynomial has a solution in the interval (−1,1). In
fact, as the next table shows, this condition is satisﬁed for the six cases we analyze here, provided

































in eq (15) yes yes* yes* yes yes* yes*
* for permissible (i.e.low) values of η and γ
Another thing to notice in (15) is that β, the slope of the dynamic reaction functions does not
depend on the levels of the subsidies s1 or s2, since for f(.) quadratic, all second derivatives are
constant.
In the steady state of the staggered game, both governments will set the same subsidies s1 =
s2 =¯ s. The following proposition characterizes the steady state stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium
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Proposition 1 The steady state stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium subsidy in the staggered game
is the value of ¯ s satisfying
f1 (¯ s, ¯ s)+δβf2 (¯ s, ¯ s) = 0(16)
with β ∈ (−1,1) given by the solution to equation (15).









t+τ) of a slight change of the level of the subsidy ˆ s.T h e
subsidy is set for two periods, so the direct eﬀect is given by (1 +δ)f1 (¯ s, ¯ s). However, there is also
a strategic eﬀect to be considered: a change in today’s subsidy will also lead the other government
to change its subsidy in the next period according to β, the slope of the dynamic reaction function.
Since the other government’s action is also set for two periods, then it has to be multiplied by (1+δ)
and since the eﬀect on the other government starts next period, it has to be discounted using δ. The
total strategic eﬀect is therefore δ(1+δ)βf2 (¯ s, ¯ s). The eﬀect of this slight change in the level of the
subsidy only lasts for three periods since the government that eﬀected the small change reoptimizes
after two periods.
2.3 Comparison and welfare implications
Given the properties of the equilibrium subsidy in the synchronized and staggered game, we can
proceed to compare ˆ s and ¯ s. The following proposition shows that they will be ordered depending
on whether subsidies are strategic substitutes or complements in the static game.
Proposition 2 If subsidies are strategic substitutes (complements), the output subsidy ¯ s chosen in
the staggered game is higher (lower) than the output subsidy ˆ s chosen in the synchronized game.
That is:
f12 < 0 → ¯ s>ˆ s
f12 > 0 → ¯ s<ˆ s
The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose we are in and odd period in the staggered game
and subsidies are strategic substitutes (f12 < 0). Government 1 has to decide on its subsidy, knowing
that government 2 is tied up by its choice of the subsidy in the previous (even) period and can only
respond in the next period (also an even period). Government 1 is therefore a (temporary) leader.
This does not happen in the synchronized game. We already pointed out that the synchronized
game is equivalent to the static game with simultaneous moves.
Proposition 2 shows how this diﬀerence leads to diﬀerent levels of the output subsidy: if subsidies
are strategic substitutes (f12 < 0), government 1 is aware that, by increasing his subsidy s1 relative
to the synchronized subsidy ¯ s, government 2 will reduce s2 next period. Therefore dynamic reaction
functions are downward sloping (β<0).23 This in turn implies a positive eﬀect on government
23Recall that the subsidy s1 set today (odd period) by government 1 will still be in place next period, and would
therefore condition government 2 to respond as a Stackelberg follower lowering his choice of subsidy s2 in that (even)
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Figure 1: Time pattern of equilibrium subsidies in the synchronized (ˆ s) and the staggered (¯ s) game
(the relative level of steady state subsidies ˆ s and ¯ s is represented here for the case of strategic
substitutes)
1’s beneﬁt because of the negative spillover of government 2’s subsidy (f2(si,s −i) < 0). Therefore
government 1 decides to increase its subsidy beyond the static equilibrium ˆ s. The same reasoning
is true when it is government 2’s time to decide on even periods. The end result is that both
governments set a subsidy above the equilibrium subsidy in the static game. This strategic incentive







.24 Since this strategic eﬀect only appears in the period after the choice
of subsidy is done, it has to be discounted by δ. Notice that we can use a similar line of reasoning
to conclude that, if subsidies are strategic complements, the steady-state subsidy in the staggered
game is lower than the subsidy in the synchronized game.
Figure 1 represents the time pattern of equilibrium subsidies in the synchronized and the stag-
gered game, where subsidies set in the same period are interconnected by a straight line and govern-
ments are represented by gray—round or black—square patterns. For instance, in this example, both
governments set their subsidies in odd periods in the synchronized game. In the staggered game,
the government represented by grey—round patterns sets its subsidies in odd periods, whereas the
other government sets its subsidy in even periods. In the steady state, staggered subsidies are higher
than synchronized subsidies if subsidies are strategic substitutes, and lower if subsidies are strategic
complements.
Given that subsidies are higher in the staggered game under strategic substitutes, we would
expect that welfare will also be lower than in the synchronized equilibrium. The opposite result is
obtained in the case of strategic complements. This is summarized in the following proposition and
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Figure 2: Subsidies as strategic substitutes.
proved in the appendix.
Proposition 3 If subsidies are strategic substitutes, government beneﬁts φ
i
t (i =1 ,2)a r eh i g h e r
when subsidies are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. If subsidies are strategic
complements, government beneﬁts are higher when subsidies are set sequentially.
The intuition for this result becomes clear in ﬁgures 2 and 3. in both cases, since f2 < 0, then
iso-beneﬁt lines for government i are concave lines, where, for a given domestic subsidy si, domestic
beneﬁts decrease on the foreign subsidy. The reaction functions of the corresponding static game
are denoted Fi(s−i)a n dF−i(si) for the domestic and foreign governments. Note that, given the
ﬁrst order condition (6), these are also the reaction functions for the synchronized game. Figure 2
shows the case when subsidies are strategic substitutes (downward sloping static reaction functions).
Under synchronization, the equilibrium subsidy is ˆ s and both governments are at point A in every
period. Under staggering, both governments set the same subsidy ¯ s above ˆ s. This would imply
that one is on the 45 degree line above and to the right of A. Given that the iso-beneﬁt line has a
slope of zero at A, staggering implies a lower beneﬁt than synchronization in each period for both
governments. Figure 3 shows the case of strategic complements. Again, under synchronization, the
equilibrium subsidiy ˆ s and both governments are in point A every period (at the intersection of both
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Figure 3: Subsidies as strategic complements.
means being on the 45 degree line below and to the left of A. Given that the iso-beneﬁt line has a
slope of zero at A, staggering implies a higher beneﬁt than synchronization each period, as it leaves
both governments inside their iso-beneﬁt lines passing through A.
2.4 Endogenous timing of subsidy-setting
Lastly, we endogenize the timing of both governments. There are various ways of doing this. In
section 2.6 we allow governments to remain inactive if they are uncommitted to a subsidy from
the previous period. This creates the possibility of an endogenous switch between synchronization
and staggering. Here, we present a simpler attempt to endogenizing the timing of subsidy-setting.
Suppose that before subsidies are chosen, both governments have to decide simultaneously whether
they will set their subsidies in odd or in even periods. After that decision is taken, time starts and
they collect their beneﬁts according to (4). In order to avoid problems deﬁning the start of the
game, and to maintain symmetry between the choices of even and odd periods, we will assume that
nature decides whether the ﬁrst period is odd or even after choices are made.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, governments set subsidies in the same periods (synchronization)
if subsidies are strategic substitutes. Governments alternate (staggering) if subsidies are strategic
complements.
Proof. See appendix.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 13
2.5 Stochastic length of commitment to a trade policy
Here we may suppose that time is continuous and payoﬀs are discounted at rate r. Instantaneous
beneﬁts f(si,s −i) now represents a ﬂow per unit of time. When a government sets a subsidy, its
period of commitment to that action is stochastic (for example, its time in oﬃce). For simplicity we
can assume that commitment length follows a Poisson process. In the interval  t, the probability
that commitment will end is λ t. Although we expect that the results would not change considerably
with respecto to section 1, this allows us to see the eﬀect of government instability over trade policy.
Due to the Poisson assumption, the length of time the other government has been committed to
his action is not relevant, since the probability of ending his commitment does not depend on the
length of time elapsed so far. Therefore, a Markov strategy only depends on the subsidy set by the
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where V 1 
s2
is the net present value of beneﬁts to government 1 given that it is his moment to
decide on a new subsidy and government 2 was committed to s2 in the previous instant and W1(s1)
is the net present value of beneﬁts to government 1 assuming that it is currently committed to s1
and it is government 2’s chance to act and set a subsidy s2 optimally (s2 = R2(s1)).
Dynamic reaction functions Ri(s−i) are deﬁned as before. They have to satisfy the ﬁrst and











25For example, take the deﬁnition of V 1(s2) in (17), multiply both sides by ert and reorder to get:
V 1(s2)ert = Max
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divide by  t and take the limit as  t goes to zero:





which results in (19). Similar steps lead to from (18) to (21).Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 14
Notice that (22) and (23) are the analogs of the ﬁrst and second order conditions for the deterministic
case, except that δ is replaced by λ. An analog of condition (15) applies to this case:
Lemma 5 In any symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium to the game deﬁned in equations (19) to




3λ(r +2 λ)f22 + β
22λ(r + λ)f12 + β(r + λ)(r +2 λ)f11 +( r + λ)2f12 = 0(24)
Again, we will assume that the condition in the previous lemma is satisﬁed so there exists a
solution β between zero and one in absolute value.26
In the steady state of this game, both governments will set the same subsidies s1 = s2 =  s. The
following proposition characterizes the steady state stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game
with random length of commitment. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 6 The steady state stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium subsidy in the game with random
commitment is the value of  s satisfying





βf2 ( s, s) = 0(25)
with β ∈ (−1,1) given by the solution to equation (24) in lemma 5. Also, the subsidy  s chosen in
the game with random length of commitment is higher than the subsidy ˆ s chosen in the static game
(i.e.  s>ˆ s) under strategic substitutes and lower than the subsidy chosen in the static game under
strategic complements. That is:
f12 < 0 →  s>ˆ s
f12 > 0 →  s<ˆ s
Notice, from (25) that actually the subsidy  s converges to the static subsidy ˆ s as λ goes to
zero. This just reﬂects that, as λ goes to zero, the expected length of time during which the foreign
government will remain committed to his policy goes to inﬁnity. Since the domestic government
will have no chance to act as a Stackelberg leader, then all dynamic strategic incentives dissapear,
and we are back to the static equilibrium subsidy. Another way to look at this is to note that
bringing λ to zero is equivalent to bringing the discount factor to zero in the deterministic case. If
the future has no value for both governments, then they just play the static equilibrium. This leads
to the conjecture that, as λ increases, strategic eﬀects become more important, as the average time
during which a government is committed to his action is shorter, therefore bringing forward the time
when an uncommitted government will become a temporary stackelberg leader. We would therefore
expect ∂ s
∂λ > 0if subsidies are strategic substitutes and ∂ s
∂λ < 0if subsidies are strategic complements:
shorter commitment periods make governments use strategic trade policy more aggresively.27
26This condition is always fulﬁlled for the case of Cournot and Bertrand Competition without R&D investment.
When ﬁrms can invest in R&D, the condition is fulﬁlled for permissible (i.e. low) values of η and γ in equations (1)
to (3).
27Notice also that in this game with variable (random) length of commitment, governments behave quite similar to
the staggering case in the deterministic model. In fact, this is reminiscent of a result showed in de Fraja (1993). InPolicy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 15
2.6 Inactive Governments
In this extension, suppose that governments are not constrained to move in odd or even periods.
If government i is currently not committed to a subsidy level, it may choose not to intervene, and
therefore set si =0 . However, whenever government i decides to set a subsidy si > 0, it remains
committed to it for two periods. As Maskin and Tirole (1988a) point out, the payoﬀ relevant
information in this case is, ﬁrst, whether the other government is committed to a subsidy for the
current period, and second, if it is committed, what is the level s−i of that committed subsidy.
As in Maskin and Tirole (1988a), Markov strategies for government i can be described by the
pair {Ri(.),σi}, where Ri(.) is the reaction of government i to government −i’s current subsidy
(when it was committed to in the previous period) and σi is government i’s subsidy when the other
government is not committed to a subsidy, either because it chose a subsidy two periods ago, or
because it chose not to intervene (s−i = 0) in the previous period. Notice that σi has no arguments
because, if the other player is uncommitted, there is no payoﬀ relevant variable. Notice also that
when governments use R(.) along the equilibrium path, they alternate in moves and a null action
switches them into synchronization. When governments choose σ, they choose simultaneously, and
therefore, the possibility of a null action can switch the game from synchronization to staggering.
Figure 4 illustrates a possible time pattern of subsidy setting, where subsidies set together in the
same period are displayed linked with a straight line, governments are diﬀerentiated according to
round gray or square black patterns, and there exists a possibility of inaction (represented by a
subsidy set equal to zero).
We check robustness of the synchronized or staggered equilibria in the sense of Maskin and Tirole
(1988, section 9). The next proposition shows that, under strategic substitutes the synchronized
equilibrium (ˆ s, ˆ s) is robust. Conversely, under strategic complements, the staggered equilibrium is
robust.
Proposition 7 Under strategic substitutes,
1. If the discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1, then
(a) the tuple {(R(.),σ),(R(.),σ)}, where {R(.),R(.)} (played with probability ω =0 ) is the
equilibrium of the staggered gamea n dσ =ˆ s is the equilibrium subsidy in the synchronized
gamei saMarkovp erfect equilibrium of the game with endogenous timing
(b) starting from the staggered mode (R,R),g o vernments swi t c ht ot h es ynchronized mode
immediately and remain there indeﬁnitely.
2. If the discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1, then the Markovp erfect equilibrium of the
staggered game {R(.),R(.)} is not robust to endogenous timing. In particular, there are no
strategies {σ∗,σ∗} for the simultaneous mode such that {(R(.),σ),(R(.),σ)} is a Markovp erfect
equilibrium of the endogenous-timing game.
an extension of his model of staggered wage settlements, he modiﬁes the standard model to allow for commitment to
n>2 periods. In such a model, the number m of periods between moves of the two players can vary (m<n ). He
then asks what would be the eﬀect of changing the number m of periods between moves of players on the equilibrium.
He just shows that we just need to replace δn for δ in the equilibrium equations, so, surprisingly, m plays no role. All
that matters is the length of commitment, but not how that time is divided between the two players.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 16
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Figure 4: A possible time pattern of subsidy-setting when governments may choose to be inactive
in some periods.
We also show that the staggered equilibrium {R(.),R(.)} is robust under strategic complements:
Proposition 8 Under strategic complements,
1. If the discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1, then
(a) the tuple {(R(.),σ),(R(.),σ)}, where {R(.),R(.)} is the equilibrium of the staggered game
and σ =ˆ s (played with probability ω =0 ) is the equilibrium subsidy in the synchronized
gamei saMarkovp erfect equilibrium of the game with endogenous timing
(b) starting from the synchronized mode (σ,σ),g o vernments switch to the staggered mode
immediately and remain there indeﬁnitely.
2. If the discount factor δ is suﬃciently close to 1, then the Markovp erfect equilibrium of the
synchronized game {σ∗,σ∗} (with σ∗ =ˆ s) is not robust to endogenous timing. In particular,
there are no strategies {R(.),R(.)} for the staggered mode such that {(R(.),σ),(R(.),σ)} is a
Markovp erfect equilibrium of the endogenous-timing game.
What these two propositions tell us is that synchronization seem more robust than staggering
under strategic substitutes and vice-versa. Therefore, if we have strategic substitutes and we endog-
enize the timing of the choice of subsidies in this way, we could observe the type of switch observed
in period t + 2 in ﬁgure 4, where governments move from staggering into synchronization. The
second part of proposition 7 on the other hand states that the type of switch observed in period t+5
in ﬁgure 4 cannot happen in equilibrium under strategic substitutes: if we are in the synchronizedPolicy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 17
mode, we remain there forever. The conclusions are reversed in the case of strategic complements
in proposition 8.
2.7 Predetermined (but ﬂexible) trade policy
In this extension, suppose that governments are committed to choose subsidy levels for two con-
secutive periods, but subsidies in both periods may diﬀer. For example, in the staggered game,
government 1 has to decide, in odd periods, its subsidy for that period s1
t and its subsidy for the
next period s1
t+1. In the original setup we were restricted to s1
t = s1
t+1. Here we eliminate that
restriction and allow for s1
t  = s1
t+1. Therefore subsidies are pre-committed but not ﬁxed.
As before we will assume that government 1 sets its subsidy in odd periods and government 2 in
even periods. If t is an odd period government 1 has to set its subsidies for the next two periods s1
t
and s1
t+1, and similarly for government 2 in even periods.
2.7.1 Flexible synchronized Subsidy-setting
Markov strategies for government 1 in the synchronized game will depend on the two subsidies












given that the two periods are alike, both subsidies si
t and si
t+1 are identical. Let si denote the
choice of government i, then the ﬁrst order conditions imply
f1(si,s −i) = 0(26)
with the same second order and stability conditions as in the synchronized game in section 2.1.
Therefore the synchronized game yields the same equilibrium subsidy ˆ s.
2.7.2 Flexible staggered subsidy-setting
In the staggered game, we need to modify the value functions and dynamic reaction functions used
in section 2.2. In particular, since a government needs to specify two subsidies each time, we need
to specify two reaction functions. Let Fi(s
−i
2 ) be the reaction function of government i for the ﬁrst
period for which it has to set a subsidy, depending on the subsidy set by government −i for its
second period of commitment s
−i
2 . Also, let Si(s
−i
2 ) be the reaction function of government i for the
second period for which it has to set a subsidy, as a function of s
−i
2 . Under these deﬁnitions, note
that F1 and S2 are reaction functions for odd periods, and F2 and S1 are reaction functions for
even periods. These four reaction functions are Markov perfect strategies if and only if there exists
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We can rewrite equation (27) to state more clearly the deﬁnition of Fi(s
−i




































































and therefore the dynamic reaction functions Fi(s
−i





have to satisfy the ﬁrst order
























































































































where we have assumed that both Fi(.)a n dSi(.) are linear functions.
Notice that equation (31) implicitly deﬁnes Fi(s
−i
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which implicitly deﬁnes a reaction function for the subsidy for second period si






however, that in (34) s
−i












2 = 0and so si
2 is independent of the choice of subsidy by the other
government in the previous period (s
−i



















The following proposition summarizes the results so far












2) is a MarkovP erfect Equi-
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After characterizing the Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, we can investigate the rela-
tionship between the subsidies set in the ﬁrst and second period by each government si
1 and si
2 and
the subsidy set in the synchronized game ˆ s. The following proposition states the main result of this
section.
Proposition 10 In a symmetric Markovp erfect equilibrium:
1. Under strategic substitutes, subsidies set by both governments in their ﬁrst periods are smaller
than the subsidy set in the synchronized game. Subsidies set in their second periods are bigger
than that set in the synchronized game:
si
1 < ˆ s<s i
2
2. Under strategic complements, subsidies set by both governments in both periods are lower than
subsidies set in the synchronized game. Subsidies set in their second periods are lower than
those set in their ﬁrst periods of commitment.
si
2 <s i
1 < ˆ s
The intuition for the result is simple. Recall that ˆ s, the equilibrium subsidy in the synchronized
game, coincides with the equilibrium subsidy in the simultaneous move game. On the other hand, the
equations in proposition 9 deﬁning the equilibrium subsidies in the staggered game are exactly thePolicy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 20
same equations that deﬁne equilibrium subsidies in a sequential (Stackelberg) game. In particular,
(36) states that si





is just the subsidy set by the government that acts second (the follower
government) if they play a Stackelberg game during one period. It just responds to the choice of
s
−i
2 (decided in the previous period to be eﬀective today) using its (static) reaction function Fi(.).










. That is precisely the choice of subsidy
by the leading government in the one-period Stackelberg game, knowing that the other government
will respond using its reaction function F−i(si
2). If subsidies are strategic substitutes (f12 < 0), it is
not surprising that leading subsidies (si
2), set in each “second period”, are higher than those set in
the static game (ˆ s) and that the best response (si
1), set in each “ﬁrst period” yields lower subsidies
than in the static game. On the other hand, if subsidies are strategic complements (f12 > 0), then
the “leading” government will choose lower subsidies (i.e. higher taxes) than in the static game.
But then the optimal response of the other government is also to lower its subsidy below the static
subsidy, along its reaction function. Since reaction functions have a slope smaller than 1, then
subsidies set when the government acts as a “Stackelberg leader” (i.e. during the second period of
commitment), are lower than subsidies set when the government acts as a follower (i.e. during the
ﬁrst period of commitment).
The pattern of equilibrium subsidies in both types of games is summarized in ﬁgure 5 for the case
of strategic substitutes. In that ﬁgure, subsidies set in the same period are shown interconnected by
a straight line and the two governments are shown with grey round or black square patterns. Notice
that subsidies in the ﬁrst period of commitment are lower than on the second period (s1 <s 2)a n d
they are set on each side of the synchronized subsidy ˆ s. Figure 6 shows the time pattern for the case
of strategic complements.
2.7.3 Welfare analysis and the pre-commitment game
We turn now to the analysis of welfare in the two types of games. In the synchronized game, the







τf(ˆ s, ˆ s)=
f(ˆ s, ˆ s)
1 − δ
In the staggered game, we need to distinguish whether a government is currently in a period when
it is its turn to set subsidies for the next two periods or it is in a period when it is not deciding on
policy. If we look for symmetric equilibria (where si







2τ (f(s1,s 2)+δf(s2,s 1)) =
f(s1,s 2)+δf(s2,s 1)
1 − δ
2 i =1 ,2







2τ (f(s2,s 1)+δf(s1,s 2)) =
f(s2,s 1)+δf(s1,s 2)
1 − δ
2 i =1 ,2
if government i set its subsidy in period t − 1 and therefore it is not setting policy in period t.
The following lemma (proved in the appendix) compares the three measures of government













Figure 5: Flexible subsidy-setting under strategic substitutes: time pattern of equilibrium subsidies













Figure 6: Flexible subsidy-setting under strategic complements: time pattern of equilibrium subsidies
in the synchronized and the staggered game.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 22
Proposition 11 In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, in period t
1. If subsidies are strategic substitutes
(a) the present discounted value of beneﬁts of a government in the synchronized game is bigger
than the present discounted value of beneﬁts of the government which sets its subsidy at





(b) for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the present discounted value of beneﬁts of a government
in the synchronized game is bigger than the present discounted value of beneﬁts of the
government which will set its subsidy at time t+1in the staggered game. That is, ∃¯ δ<1





2. If subsidies are strategic complements
(a) the present discounted value of beneﬁts of a government in the staggered game is bigger
than the present discounted value of beneﬁts of a government in the synchronized game.









The intuition for this proposition is simple and is better explained looking at ﬁgures 2 for the
case of strategic substitutes and 3 for the case of strategic complements.
Under strategic substitutes and in the synchronized game (ﬁgure 2), both governments set a
subsidy ˆ s which is equivalent to the equilibrium in the static game with simultaneous choice. This
is represented in the graph by point A at the intersection of both reaction functions Fi(s−i)a n d
F−i(si). In the staggered game, governments alternate being the Stackelberg leader and follower with
the same reaction functions Fi(s−i)a n dF−i(si). That means that when government i in period t
has to set its policy, it will be acting as a Stackelberg follower (since it responds to the subsidy s2 set
by the other government in the previous period), and therefore it will be at point B. Next period, it
will act as a Stackelberg leader and therefore set a subsidy equal to s2, which brings the equilibrium
outcome for that period at point C. Note that point C is just the mirror image of B along the 45
degree line. This dynamics repeats itself every two periods.




t are just a multiple of the average
beneﬁt over this two period cycle. The average of subsidies set during this two period cycle is given
by point D. Because of concavity of the beneﬁt function f(.), the beneﬁt obtained at D is bigger than
the average of beneﬁts at B and C. Since government i’s iso-beneﬁt lines (shown as thin, continuous
curves) have a slope equal to zero at their intersection with Fi(s−i), this implies that in turn a
government gets a higher beneﬁt at A than at D. Therefore beneﬁt at A is higher than the average
of beneﬁts at B and C.
If we introduce discounting between periods, we just have to realize that when a government
starts in period t at point B in the staggered game (that is, if it has to set subsidies in period t),
then it starts with a lower beneﬁt at time t than under synchronization (A). Therefore, the result
in this case is even stronger. If, on the contrary, a government starts the staggered game at point B
(that is, if it set subsidies in period t−1) then the average subsidy between the two periods (s2+δs1
1+δ )Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 23
will be somewhere between C and D and depending on how small δ is, we may get so close to C that
the present value of beneﬁts is bigger than at A.28 However, as δ b e c o m e sc l o s e rt o1 , that average
w i l lg e tc l o s e rt oD, and therefore, for δ suﬃciently big, we can still apply the same reasoning of the
case δ =1 .
The case of strategic complements (ﬁgure 3) is even simpler because when the government acts as
a leader or as a follower, it gets beneﬁts that are higher than under the static equilibrium. That can
be seen in ﬁgure 3 since points B and C yiel a higher beneﬁt than point A (the static equilibrium).
Therefore, the convex combination of B and C is better for each government than A.
Suppose now that governments play a pre-commitment game before starting setting subsidies.
Governments have to choose simultaneously whether they want to set their subsidies in odd or even
periods. Of course, we have to modify slightly the previous setting to take care of the ﬁrst period,
in which it may be the case that one of the governments is not choosing a policy and it is not
committed by a previous decision (for example in the staggered game). Therefore, we will assume
that after choosing in which period to set their subsidies, uncommitted governments in the ﬁrst
period choose their subsidy for that ﬁrst period and then follow the two-period setting as before.
To avoid asymmetries in the choice of odd or even periods, we will also assume that after choices
are made, nature tosses a fair coin to decide whether the ﬁrst period is odd or even.
With this setting, if, for example, government 1 chooses to set their policy in odd periods and
government 2 chooses to set it in even periods, we will have a staggered game. If nature decides that
the ﬁrst period is odd, then, in the ﬁrst period, government 1 sets its subsidies for period 1 and 2
and government 2 will only set its subsidy for period 1.
The equilibrium in the ﬁrst period of this augmented game can be easily derived. If both
governments choose to set their subsidies in the same periods (synchronization), then, after nature
decides, there are two possibilities. In the ﬁrst case, they may have to set it in the ﬁrst period,
and therefore we have a synchronized game from the start, with equilibrium (ˆ s, ˆ s). The other
possibility is that they have to set subsidies in the second period. In this last case, they will have
to simultaneously choose their subsidies for the ﬁrst period, and, since that choice does not aﬀect
future choices, we will have the static equilibrium (ˆ s, ˆ s).
Turn attention now to the case in which they are choosing their subsidies in diﬀerent periods
(staggering). Without loss of generality, assume that government 1 chooses odd periods, government
2 chooses even periods and nature chose that the ﬁrst period would be odd. Therefore, government
2 will have to choose freely its subsidy for the ﬁrst period. Government 1 will choose s2 for the
second period since that choice is independent of government 2’s choice for the ﬁrst period (see eq.
(37)). In the ﬁrst period, government 1’s choice of subsidy does not depend on previous subsidies set
by government 2 (this is the ﬁrst period) and will not aﬀect future choices of government 2 either.
Therefore, the game in the ﬁrst period becomes a simultaneous move game, with equilibrium (ˆ s, ˆ s).
This result is summarized in the following
Lemma 12 The equilibrium in the ﬁrst period of the game is given by the subsidy pair (ˆ s, ˆ s). That
28Notice that in general point C, as the Stackelberg point, always yields a higher beneﬁt to government i than
point A. If, for example, δ equals zero, then government i would get a higher beneﬁt from staggering than from
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is, regardless of the choice of timing by both governments, they will choose the same subsidy for the
ﬁrst period as in the synchronized game.
Given that both types of timing give the same payoﬀ for the ﬁrst period, we can compute the
expected payoﬀs from each strategy pair starting from the second period. If we write the game in
































der strategic substitutes and the opposite under strategic complements. Therefore, under strategic
substitutes we have two equilibria: (odd,odd) or (even,even). Both equilibria lead to synchroniza-
tion. Under strategic complements we have two equilibria as well: (odd,even) or (even,odd). Both
equilibria lead to staggering in this case. Therefore, we have proved the next proposition.
Proposition 13 Under strategic substitutes, synchronization is the equilibrium outcome of the “pre-
commitment” game between the two governments, which implies constant subsidies. Under strategic
complements, staggering is the equilibrium of the “pre-commitment” game, which leads to cyclical
subsidies.
Therefore, introducing ﬂexibility in the choice of governments only makes a diﬀerence in the
case of strategic complements. In the case of strategic substitutes, the endogenous timing leads to
synchronization, and thus to the return to the static equilibrium.
3 Conclusions
We have developed a dynamic model where governments can alternate their trade policy or they
can synchronize the timing of their policy-setting. We have found that, when governments alternate
(stagger) their choice of trade policy and ﬁrms compete ´ a la Cournot in a third market, governments
choose subsidies which are higher than under the corresponding static (one-shot) version of the
model. Therefore, retaliation and the possibility of being a temporary Stackelberg leader, make
governments pursue a more aggressive strategic trade policy to shift proﬁts from foreign ﬁrms into
domestic ones. We have extended the analysis in a number of ways, including endogenizing the
timing of policy-setting. We have found that governments are then able to reach an equilibrium in
which they set their policy simultaneously, therefore reducing the harm imposed on their attempt
to divert proﬁts from foreign ﬁrms.30
29Simply set δ = 1 in equations (57) (58) to obtain the result.
30Note that the reduction in welfare (respect to free trade) caused by the simultaneous subsidy still remains.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 25
A particular assumption we have used in this paper is that governments play the leading role in
the dynamic interaction between the four players. Firms are assumed myopic or short lived. This
raises the issue of whether trade policy would be closer to the cooperative solution if ﬁrms are allowed
to play this dynamic game more actively, inﬂuencing not only the choice of the other ﬁrms, but also
the choice of the other two governments. A partial step in this direction is Castro and Brand˜ ao
(2000) which proves the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between two
ﬁrms and one government in a third country model like ours. However, they do not derive the
properties of the equilibrium subsidy in that model. We plan to pursue this line of research in a
separate project.Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 26
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Since f(.) is quadratic, fij(.) is constant so, abusing notation, we can forget about the arguments








where the last equality comes from our restriction to linear dynamic reaction functions Ri(s−i)=
αi + β
is−i. Therefore, Wi
11(.) is a constant under this assumption. From now on we will also omit
the arguments of this function.

















Using our assumption of linear dynamic reaction functions Ri(s−i)=αi+β































































































































Using again the fact that fij (i,j =1 ,2) and Wi



































































In the staggered game, the steady state equilibrium subsidy will be the same for both governments:
si = s−i =¯ s. Therefore, from (39), the expression for Wi
1 at the steady state equilibrium becomes:
Wi
1(¯ s)=f1 (¯ s, ¯ s)+f2 (¯ s, ¯ s) · β
−i + δf1 (¯ s, ¯ s) · β
−iβ
i + δf2 (¯ s, ¯ s) · β
−i + δ
2Wi (¯ s) · β
−iβ
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If we analyze the symmetric solution where β
i = β
−i = β, then
Wi
1(¯ s)=








Replacing this into the ﬁrst order condition (13) yields
f1 (¯ s, ¯ s)+δ
 











f1 (¯ s, ¯ s)+δβf2 (¯ s, ¯ s) = 0(41)
with β given by (38).
B Proof of Proposition 2
Notice ﬁrst that the stability condition (8) for the synchronized game and the concavity of f(.)
implies that f1(s,s) is a linear and decreasing function with constant slope:
∂f1(s,s)
∂s
= f11 + f12 < 0(42)
Suppose the subsidies are strategic substitutes, and so f12 < 0: an increase in the subsidy set by
one government reduces the marginal beneﬁt of a subsidy set by the other government. Also, an
increase in the subsidy set by one government reduces the beneﬁt of the other government, so that
f2(si,s −i) < 0.
Notice also that β =
−f12
f11+δWi
11(Ri(s−i)). Using the second order condition (14) of the maximization
problem in (10) we can easily see that β and f12 have the same sign. So f12 < 0implies that
β ∈ (−1,0), that is, dynamic reaction functions are downward sloping. Therefore δβf2 (¯ s, ¯ s) > 0
and thus f1 (¯ s, ¯ s) < 0from (16).
Since we have established that f1(s,s) is a decreasing function, then f1 (¯ s, ¯ s) < 0=f1(ˆ s, ˆ s)
implies that ¯ s>ˆ s as stated in the proposition.
Notice that the same line of reasoning can be used to show that ¯ s<ˆ s if subsidies are strategic
complements.
C Proof of Proposition 3
If s∗ is the symmetric cooperative equilibrium value of the subsidy s, then it will satisfy
s∗ = argMax
s f(s,s)
therefore s∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
f1(s∗,s ∗)+f2(s∗,s ∗) = 0(43)Policy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 28
with second-order condition
f11 +2 f12 + f22 < 0(44)
Notice that the conditions that that deﬁne the synchronized equilibrium subsidy ˆ s, the equilib-
rium staggered subsidy ¯ s and the cooperative solution s∗ can be summarized as
f1(s∗,s ∗)+K∗f2(s∗,s ∗)=0
f1(¯ s, ¯ s)+ ¯ Kf2(¯ s, ¯ s)=0
f1(ˆ s, ˆ s)+ ˆ Kf2(ˆ s, ˆ s)=0





f11 + f12 + K(f12 + f22)
=
−f2(s,s)
f11 +2 f12 + f22 − (1 − K)(f12 + f22)
where the numerator is positive. Recall that the stability condition (8) implies f11 + f12 < 0. If
subsidies are strategic substitutes, then f12 < 0, which implies K = δβ ∈ (−1,0). We have two
cases:
If f12 +f22 > 0then f11 +f12 +K(f12 +f22) < 0. If f12 +f22 < 0then (44) implies |f11 + f12| >
|f12 + f22| > |K(f12 + f22)| and so f11+f12+K(f12+f22) < 0. Therefore, under strategic substitutes,
∂s
∂K < 0.
If subsidies are atrategic complements, then f12 > 0, which implies K = δβ ∈ (0,1). We also
examine two cases:
If f12 +f22 > 0then f11 +f12+K(f12 +f22)=f11 +2f12+f22 −(1−K)(f12 +f22) < 0because
of (44) and K ∈ (0,1). If f12 +f22 < 0then f11 +f12 +K(f12 +f22) < 0. Therefore, under strategic
complements we have that ∂s
∂K < 0.
Under strategic substitutes, ¯ K = δβ ∈ (−1,0), and therefore ¯ K<ˆ K<K ∗ which implies
s∗ < ˆ s<¯ s. Under strategic complements, ¯ K = δβ ∈ (0,1), and therefore ˆ K<¯ K<K ∗ which implies
s∗ < ¯ s<ˆ s. Since the payoﬀ function f(.,.) is quadratic, synchronization yields higher payoﬀs under
strategic substitutes, and staggering yields higher payoﬀs under strategic complements, as they move
equilibrium subsidies closer to the joint maximum.
D Proof of Proposition 4











τf(ˆ s, ˆ s),
 ∞
τ=0 δ
τf(ˆ s, ˆ s)
 ∞
τ=0 δ
τf(¯ s, ¯ s),
 ∞
τ=0 δ






τf(¯ s, ¯ s),
 ∞
τ=0 δ
τf(¯ s, ¯ s)
 ∞
τ=0 δ
τf(ˆ s, ˆ s),
 ∞
τ=0 δ
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Under strategic substitutes, s∗ < ˆ s<¯ s. Therefore f(ˆ s, ˆ s) >f (¯ s, ¯ s), and the only equilibrium
strategies in the game are . In any case, this implies that both governments prefer to set their
policy in the same periods, leading to synchronization. Under strategic complements, s∗ < ¯ s<ˆ s.
Therefore f(ˆ s, ˆ s) <f(¯ s, ¯ s) and the only equilibria are (even,odd)o r( odd,even), that is, staggering.
E Proof of Lemma 5








where the last equality comes from our restriction to linear dynamic reaction functions Ri(s−i)=
αi + β
is−i. Therefore, Wi
11(.) is a constant under this assumption (see also Lau, 1997). From now
on we will also omit the arguments of this function.

























Using our assumption of linear dynamic reaction functions Ri(s−i)=αi+β































































































































































Using again the fact that fij (i,j =1 ,2) and Wi





























































































Substituting the value of Wi









































 + f12 =0
that is, we have a system of two equations:
f11(r + λ)(r +2 λ)β
1 + f12
 
r + λ + λβ
1β
2 2





f11(r + λ)(r +2 λ)β
2 + f12
 
r + λ + λβ
2β
1 2










f11(r + λ) − f22λβ
1β
2 
=0( 5 0 )
Therefore we have two possible cases. If f22 =0 , then (50) implies that there is only a symmetric
solution β
1 = β
2 = β. If, on the contrary, f22  = 0and there is an asymmetric solution (with
β















      > 1t h e na tl e a s to n eo ft h eβ
j (j =1 ,2) has an absolute value greater than one and
therefore the asymmetric equilibrium is unstable and can be ruled out.
The symmetric solution (β
1 = β




3λ(r +2 λ)f22 + β
22λ(r + λ)f12 + β(r + λ)(r +2 λ)f11 +( r + λ)2f12 =0
which is the polynomial (24) in the statement of the lemma.
F Proof of Proposition 6
In the game with random commitment, the steady state equilibrium subsidy will be the same for
both governments: si = s−i =   s. Therefore, from (46), the expression for Wi




f1 (  s,  s)
r + λ
+



















1 (  s) · β
−iβ
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If we analyze the symmetric solution where β
i = β






























Replacing this into the ﬁrst order condition (22) yields









































βf2 (  s,  s) = 0(51)
with β given by (45).
Also note that, since β =
−f12
f11+λW i
11,(see (45)) then using the second order condition (23) and
f12 < 0we can conclude that β<0. Therefore, using the same procedure as in the proof of
proposition 2 we can show that   s>ˆ s>s ∗ if subsidies are strategic substitutes and ˆ s>  s>s ∗ if
subsidies are strategic complements.
G Proof of Proposition 7
Consider a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (ˆ s, ˆ s) of the synchronized game, and let ¯ R1, ¯ R2 be
the mixed strategy which plays the equilibrium reaction functions R1(.)a n dR2(.) of the staggered
game in eq. (10)-(12) with probability ω and the “inactive” strategy with probability 1 − ω.W e
need to prove that
 
( ¯ R1, ˆ s),( ¯ R2, ˆ s)
 
is a Markov perfect equilibrium of the game with endogenous
timing.
Note ﬁrst that, in the synchronized mode, when governments are setting (ˆ s, ˆ s)e v e r yt w op e r i o d s ,
since they are equilibrium strategies in the synchronized game, they never entail the choice of the
“inactive strategy, and therefore, once governments are in the synchronized mode, they remain there
forever.
Now turn to the staggered mode. Government i, when it is its time to act, will have an incentive
to remain inactive during one period and turn the game into a synchronized game since f(0, ¯ s)+
δ
f(ˆ s,ˆ s)
1−δ >f (¯ s, ¯ s)+δ
f(¯ s,¯ s)
1−δ for δ suﬃciently close to 1. This implies that they would optimally set
ω = 0in their mixed strategy ¯ Ri
Left to show is that a government, when in the synchronized mode, has no incentive to play the
“inactive” strategy, given that the other government is playing according to (R−i(.), ˆ s). If it did,
they would be switching to staggering and therefore earning lower beneﬁts since f(0, ˆ s)+δ
f(¯ s,¯ s)
1−δ <
f(ˆ s, ˆ s)+δ
f(ˆ s,ˆ s)
1−δ as ¯ s>ˆ s>0. This means that once governments enter into the synchronized mode,
they will never switch to staggering.
Combining these two claims, we complete the proof of parts 1a and 1b of the proposition.
To prove part 2, note that if there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium involving the equilibrium
reaction functions R1(.)a n dR2(.) of the staggered game, then, since those strategies do not callPolicy Synchronization vs. Staggering - Kujal & Ruiz (2002) - February 4, 2003 32
for inaction as part of the equilibrium, once we reach staggering, both governments will continue in
that mode forever, and thus earn f(¯ s, ¯ s)+δ
f(¯ s,¯ s)
1−δ .
If governments are in the simultaneous mode, they would have to play the equilibrium subsidy
ˆ s (recall that this is the unique equilibrium subsidy of the simultaneous game). But then playing
Ri(.) when the other government is committed is not an equilibrium strategy: if government i
plays “inactive” instead, can switch the game to synchronous mode and get f(0, ¯ s)+δ
f(ˆ s,ˆ s)
1−δ >
f(¯ s, ¯ s)+δ
f(¯ s,¯ s)
1−δ for δ suﬃciently close to 1.
For the same reason, when governments are in synchronized mode, they will never choose inaction
and switch to staggering since that would imply, for the government that chooses inaction, a payoﬀ
equal to f(0, ˆ s)+δ
f(¯ s,¯ s)
1−δ <f(ˆ s, ˆ s)+δ
f(ˆ s,ˆ s)
1−δ
H Proof of Proposition 8
****** COMPLETE HERE USING SAME LINE OF REASONING THAN PROOF OF PROPO-
SITION 7 *******
I Proof of Proposition 10
Note that the conditions for a Markov perfect equilibrium imply that the synchronized subsidy ˆ s
satisﬁes (see eq.(26))
f1(ˆ s, ˆ s) = 0(52)
Now turn to the staggered game. According to proposition 9, if si
1 and si
2 (i =1 ,2) are equilibrium




























=0 i =1 ,2 (55)
θ1(si
2) < 0(56)
First, note that from (52) and (54) we have Fi(ˆ s)=ˆ s.
Recall that f2 < 0and f11 < 0. Under strategic substitutes f12 < 0and therefore θ(ˆ s) > 0=
θ(si
2). Since the second order condition (56) implies that θ(.) is decreasing, it follows that si
2 < ˆ s




2 ) >Fi(ˆ s)=ˆ s>s i
2.
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J Proof of Proposition 11









suﬃciently close to 1. These two statements are equivalent to prove that
f(ˆ s, ˆ s) >
f(s1,s 2)+δf(s2,s 1)
1+δ
for all δ ∈ [0,1]
∃¯ δ<1s . t . f(ˆ s, ˆ s) >
f(s2,s 1)+δf(s1,s 2)
1+δ
for δ ∈ (¯ δ,1]
Note that, because of the linearity of the reaction function, Fi(s2)=Fi(ˆ s)+Fi
1(ˆ s)[s2 − ˆ s]. Since
Fi(s2)=s1 (eq. (53)) and from (52) and (54) we have Fi(ˆ s)=ˆ s. therefore
s1 − ˆ s = −
f12
f11
(s2 − ˆ s)
Using f12 < 0, f11 < 0and the stability condition (8) we know that −1 < −
f12
f11 < 0and therefore
ˆ s<s1+s2




for all δ ∈ [0,1]




for δ ∈ (¯ δ,1]
Now turn to f(ˆ s, ˆ s). From eq (42), f(x,x) is decreasing in x for x>s ∗. Since s2+δs1
1+δ > ˆ s>s ∗
(see eq. (??)) then










where the last inequality comes from the concavity of f(.). Similarly, since ˆ s<s1+δs2
1+δ for δ ∈ (¯ δ,1]
then










which completes the proof.
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